This report provides an analysis of Russian combat in Chechnya beginning with the first modern Chechen war of 1994-1996 and comparing and contrasting it with the ongoing conflict that began in 1999. While the focus is on combat in urban areas, more general aspects of the Chechnya wars are also discussed. The research reported here was initiated with the goal of better understanding what Russia's urban experience in Chechnya indicates both about Russian capabilities and operations specifically and about urban warfare generally, with lessons to be drawn for other states, including, of course, the United States. This effort was undertaken as a component of a project on military operations on urbanized terrain. The project was co-sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army. The project was conducted jointly in the Force Development and Technology Program and the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program of RAND Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. It should be of interest to policymakers and analysts concerned with the operational aspects of modern urban conflict and to those who seek to better understand the military capabilities, strategy, and tactics of the Russian Federation.